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In the Shadow of Hegel: Toward a Methodology 




In this theoretical essay, my primary task is to develop a methodology for engaging 
the conceptual normativity, or common-sense ideas, at work in the popular discur-
sive practices of modern society. To do so, I will draw upon theories associated with 
continental philosophy, Deweyan pragmatism, and sociological theory that trace 
their lineages to the works of G. W. F. Hegel in order to construct a methodology 
for the clarifi cation of terms and concepts of popular discourse that works within 
and through conceptual failure and contradiction. It is an approach that is at once 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological. My secondary task is to articulate 
the utility of the method developed here to the sociological consciousness implicit 
in philosophic inquiry. Th ere is an active component to such philosophical tasks 
as clarifying the conceptual knowledge informing public policy and social action 
that is rooted in the link between knowledge and action, between understanding 
and activity. Th is is an issue of particular importance to theorists in an applied fi eld 
such as educational theory.
In his political classic Th e Public and Its Problems, John Dewey off ers up an obser-
vation that would surely resonate with contemporary readers.
Th e social situation has been so changed by the factors of an industrial age 
that traditional general principles have little practical meaning. Th ey persist 
as emotional cries rather than as reasoned ideas. . . . Th e developments of 
industry and commerce have so complicated aff airs that a clear-cut, gener-
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ally applicable, standard of judgment becomes practically impossible. Th e 
forest cannot be seen for the trees nor the trees for the forest.1 
To clarify his point, Dewey continues with four examples in which the concepts 
employed by situated social actors to grasp the increasing complexities of sociopo-
litical life fail to provide an adequate epistemic grounding for reasoned judgment 
and lead those actors toward performative contradiction.2 From the “reversal of the 
practical meaning of the term ‘liberalism’ in spite of a literal continuity of theory”3 
to the power of political speech to “galvanize [a voter] into a temporary notion that 
he has convictions on an important”4 trade issue of which he has little knowledge, 
it is clear throughout Th e Public and Its Problems that Dewey recognized that our 
social locations provide conceptual frameworks rooted more in political ideologies, 
cultural practices, and historical precedents than in their ability to off er adequate 
explanations of empirical realities. Th is disjunction has real implications for the 
possibility of reasoned social activity in a democratic society.5
For contemporary observers, an excellent example of this problematic that so 
occupied Dewey can be found on display in the Education aisle at your local book 
retailer. Th umbing through the titles on display presents a dizzying array of educa-
tional and political terminology employed in such divergent and contradictory ways 
that it quickly becomes apparent that there is no general consensus as to what those 
concepts mean. Such terms as liberal, conservative, basics, literacy, cultural capital, 
equity, and globalization demonstrate a fl uidity of meaning within and across texts 
that serves the interest of political expediency at the expense of intellectual rigor. 
For the interested political participant seeking information on current education 
policy and practices, the ambiguity of the concepts and common-sense ideas used in 
these texts erects barriers to informed, ethical participation in the political processes 
and discursive practices infl uencing education policy. However, for philosophers, 
the ambiguity of meaning associated with the concepts of popular discourse and 
public debate has provided fertile ground for philosophic analysis. 
Th roughout the twentieth century, analytic philosophy dominated the Eng-
lish-speaking world as a school of philosophy that took the ambiguity of the con-
cepts and terminology of discourse as its principle subject. Within this line of 
thought, the ambiguity of concepts is treated as a bug in the system to be worked 
out through philosophic analysis; a clarifi cation most oft en accomplished through 
logical forms and propositions. However, the weakness of an analytic philosophy 
is to be found in what it doesn’t allow itself to see. By focusing exclusively on lan-
guage and logical forms, analytic philosophy subtly denies the dynamics in which 
concepts operate. It brackets out the contexts in which concepts are encoded and 
decoded with meaning in a dynamic society. Th is myopic view of the mechanics 
of language to the exclusion of the constellations of externalities acting upon it and 
being infl uenced by it, its politics, leads analytic philosophy to focus on individual 
trees to the exclusion of the dynamic forests in which they live. 
Grounded in Rawl’s liberal conception of justice as fairness, Brighouse’s in-
quiry into school choice and social justice makes for an excellent example of the 
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limitations of an analytical method.6 His attempt to “off er a theory of social justice 
for education policy” demonstrates sophisticated thinking on two important edu-
cational concepts at work in popular discourse, however the de-contextualized 
nature of his inquiry renders the conclusions he reaches of little political value 
or utility.7 Brighouse develops a series of logical propositions supplemented by a 
cursory, if not inadequate, review of research literature addressing school choice 
to conclude that, among other things, 1) “[e]ducational inequalities due to fam-
ily background circumstances or family choices are unacceptable,”8 and 2) that it 
is theoretically possible to achieve social justice aims in an educational market-
place.9 While I am open to the possibilities implicit in this conception of educa-
tional justice and down right suspicious of this second claim, my concerns here 
are of a more practical nature. 
What is the import of these claims for societies in which, conceptually, this 
idea of justice is already held as a general truism but are, existentially, fractured 
along the intersections of class, race, power, ethnicity, and so on? Is it reasonable 
to speculate that in a modern capitalist society so constituted, such as the US or 
the UK,10 the inequalities of a public institution can be resolved through the ap-
propriation of its institutional mandate by a regulated private marketplace? Is there 
signifi cant evidence in the research literature that school competition fosters, or 
demonstrates a signifi cant potential to foster, the realization of educational justice 
(i.e., break the linkages between family background and educational opportunity)?11 
In short, based on the best evidence available at this historical moment, within this 
sociopolitical context, what is to be done? What education policies demonstrate the 
most promise in achieving the aims of educational justice as defi ned by Brighouse? 
In this regard, Brighouse abdicates responsibility: “Ultimately, it is not up to phi-
losophers to judge what reforms can move us in the direction of social justice and 
to win political support for them: those are the tasks of citizens, activists, politicians 
and policy-makers.”12 Brighouse’s analytical inquiry into the concepts of justice and 
school choice at work in popular debates over education policy adopts an apolitical 
stance steeped in a long history of liberal politics that denies philosophic inquiry 
the possibility of rendering judgment. It is an approach to philosophic inquiry that 
seeks to disconnect from its sociopolitical context through logical analysis and, in 
so doing, renders itself incapable of intervening in the social dynamics that con-
stitutes its subject of inquiry.
In this theoretical essay, my primary task is to develop a methodology for 
engaging the conceptual normativity, or common-sense ideas, at work in modern 
society without falling prey to the pitfalls of an analytical method.13 To do so, I will 
draw upon theories associated with continental philosophy, American pragmatism, 
and sociology that trace their lineages to the works of G. W. F. Hegel. From this theo-
retical perspective, it will become apparent that the ambiguity of concepts is not a 
bug in the system but a feature. It is the product of a dynamic ontology that is frag-
mented and contradictory. I will draw upon these Hegelian-infl uenced theoretical 
perspectives in order to construct a methodology for the clarifi cation of terms and 
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concepts of popular discourse and political speech that works within and through 
conceptual failure and contradiction. It is an approach that is at once ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological; it is a method that views trees as constitutive 
elements of a dynamic forest or ecosystem . . . as an organic totality. 
My secondary task is to articulate the utility of the method developed here 
to the sociological consciousness implicit in philosophic inquiry. Th ere is an ac-
tive component to such philosophical tasks as clarifying the conceptual knowl-
edge informing public policy and social action that is rooted in the link between 
knowledge and action, between understanding and activity. More simply, there is 
a politics implicit in philosophic inquiry that must be acknowledged by its prac-
titioners. Th is is an issue of particular importance to theorists in an applied fi eld 
such as educational theory. Developing new understandings of tough educational 
issues or ideals point toward defi nite modes of human action that demand atten-
tion on the part of theorists, researchers, policy-makers and practitioners alike. 
My goal is to develop a methodology for social and educational theorists to mean-
ingfully engage popular debates over education policy via critical encounters with 
the conceptual knowledge providing the “unwritten imperative” preceding the 
implementation of specifi c policies “as an orientation, a sovereign positioning in 
space that is documented” by the implementation of a policy or social action as a 
fait accompli.14 Th e method outlined here seeks to develop new understandings out 
of the world and new modes of action in it while it develops means to establish the 
validity of those understandings and justifi cations for those actions. It is a method 
fi rmly situated within its sociopolitical context that off ers theorists the possibility 
of rendering judgment on current and proposed education policies and of making 
a positive contribution to public policy and political discourse. 
An Ontology of Modernity: A Problematic 
Returning to our Deweyan example, we see that at the core of Dewey’s complaint lies 
a more fundamental observation into the ontological dynamics of Western moder-
nity.15 Dewey is pointing us toward the “reality” that a modern society in constant 
transformation cannot fi nd its ethical and epistemological grounding in historical 
precedent or tradition. Modern society must fi nd this grounding through a contin-
ued and sustained inquiry into the dynamic processes, social relations, and complex 
interactions that constitutes modern capitalist society, a process that is mediated 
and wrought with epistemic hurdles. As we shall see, hierarchically structured and 
dynamic, modern society presents unique epistemological challenges requiring that 
individuals maintain an uneasy relationship with the conceptual knowledge and 
common sense ideas made available by their social locations.
The Discourse of Modernity 
At the heart of Dewey’s problematic are the challenges of living in transformation. 
It is a problematic that is fundamental to modern philosophy and is by no means 
unique to Deweyan pragmatism. As a subject for philosophic inquiry, modernity’s 
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peculiar relationship to history and time presents fundamental challenges to the 
possibility of reasoned social activity in an increasingly specialized and dynamic 
society that is simultaneously historically constructed and fractured. 
Tracing the origins of this philosophical conversation of modernity to the 
work of Hegel, Habermas identifi es the core of this problematic as being located in 
modernity’s time consciousness of itself.16 Th e societies that emerged in Western 
Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries defi ned themselves in terms 
of progress, growth, self-determination and revolution. Decrying the predictability 
and oppression of previous epochs, these emerging societies defi ned themselves 
in relation to historical change and elevated transformation to a normative ideal. 
To the revolutionaries of Western, capitalist society continuous developments in 
technology, science, and politics renders each historical moment unique and the 
dawn of a present-future.
[T]he secular concept of modernity expresses the conviction that the future 
has already begun: It is the epoch that lives for the future, that opens itself 
up to the novelty of the future. . . . Because the new, the modern world is 
distinguished from the old by the fact that it opens itself to the future, the 
epochal new beginning is rendered constant with each moment that gives 
birth to the new. Th us, it is characteristic of the historical consciousness 
of modernity to set off  “the most recent [neuesten] period” from the mod-
ern [neu] age: Within the horizon of the modern age, the present enjoys a 
prominent position as contemporary history.17 
Although there is much to criticize in his larger body of work, an important con-
tribution that Habermas makes to social theory in his recovery of the discourse of 
modernity is this retroubling of modernity’s relation to historical time as a funda-
mental problematic of philosophic inquiry. 
In a modern capitalist society, there is no reason to assume that the techno-
logical, political, and social dynamics of ones current social reality will continue 
unchanged into the future or that an historical past, viewed as being unique and 
never to replicated, can serve as justifi cation for activities in the present or the 
future. 
Modernity can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its 
orientation from the models supplied by another epoch; it has to create its 
normativity out of itself. Modernity sees itself cast back upon itself without 
any possibility of escape.18
Th e present-future cannot rely on the criteria of the past as justifi cation for policies 
and social action. Simply put, there is no guarantee that what is “true” today (or 
yesterday) will be “true” tomorrow. In a self-changing totality, epistemic validity 
can only be established as working ideas, contingent truths or (to use Dewey’s ter-
minology) warranted assertions that emerge from sustained inquiry into empiri-
cal realities and are validated by their ability to guide human practice and solve 
problems in the here and now. From political to social theory, Western modernity 
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denies the possibility of universal claims to normative truth requiring instead a 
refl exive approach to ethical life and reasoned social activity.19 
Th e ethical, social, and political norms necessary for the smooth functioning 
of society20 must emerge from a sustained inquiry into the dynamic processes that 
make up that social reality. If modernity must create its normativity from within 
itself then it must do so conceptually, through a process of conceptualization. How-
ever, defi ned by its embrace of progress and transformation, modernity’s uneasy 
relation to historical time stands in contradistinction to the historically constructed 
empirical realities that is its subject in the concrete. Th ere is a necessary tension 
woven into the fabric of Western modernity born of the temporal fractures im-
manent in the process of conceptualization by which societies construct their own 
normativities from their internal gaze. Marx points us toward this tension when 
he correctly notes: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circum-
stances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”21 
Building off  of Habermas’s conversation with Hegel, it is clear that the pro-
cess of conceptualization through which modern society must construct its own 
normativity takes place within the framework of a fragmented totality that is at 
once dynamic and changing while also being historically constructed and, as we 
shall see, hierarchal. Th e specialization of material, cultural, and intellectual pro-
duction in modern capitalist society22 takes place within narrow spheres of human 
activity that are hierarchically ordered and interdependent. With its roots in his-
torical precedent and tradition (or historically received), this hierarchal ordering 
of activity and occupation assigns diff ering political, economic, and social value to 
specifi c social activities along the fractures of class, gender, and ethnicity. Th us the 
common-sense ideas and concepts taken for granted by groups atop this hierarchal 
order carry disproportionate weight in the social construction of conceptual norms 
more generally. Yet, the narrowness of these concepts prove to be inadequate for 
providing an explanation of the dynamic whole to which they refer. For societies 
that must construct the norms and common-sense ideas to guide reasoned ethical 
life and social policy from within themselves, this one-sidedness leads to confl ict 
and contradiction. It leads to what Hegel calls “the way of despair.”23 
The Way of Despair
In his theories on hegemony, Antonio Gramsci’s work points to the importance 
of the conceptual norms of common sense as a subject of philosophic inquiry and 
political action. For Gramsci, hegemony is the process by which the hierarchal 
organization of modern capitalist society is actively constructed and maintained 
through sociopolitical coalitions (or historic blocs) built around specifi c conceptual 
frameworks or “common sense” ideas.24 Gramsci repeatedly referenced Marx’s ob-
servation that individuals become conscious of their life-worlds on the ideological 
terrain of common sense to emphasize the power of the everyday and the taken-
for-grantedness of practical life as a necessary element of a dynamic and fractured 
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totality.25 Gramsci’s interests in popular culture, cultural production, and the intel-
lectual function of political parties refl ects his understanding that the landscape on 
which hegemonic dominance is actively constructed is a mediated one.26 Th rough 
popular mediations, dominant groups vie for social hegemony on the ideological 
front of “common sense” by adopting, transforming, or rejecting pre-existing (or 
historically constructed) conceptual frameworks at work in popular discourse in 
order to advance specifi c sociopolitical goals.
Gramsci helps to advance our discussion on the ontological dynamics of West-
ern modernity in two important ways. First, Gramsci demonstrates that the concep-
tual norms emerging from modernity’s introspective gaze are contested frameworks 
that move within the tensions between the self-changing reality of modernity and 
its hierarchal structures constructed along the historically given and received. Yet, 
these conceptual frameworks are simultaneously capable of achieving systemic sta-
bility and are, indeed, necessary elements in creating an “operative reality.”
“[I]deologies” are anything but appearances and illusions: they are an ob-
jective and operative reality; they just are not the mainspring of history, 
that’s all. It is not ideologies that create social reality but social reality, in 
its productive structure, that creates ideologies. . . . If humans become con-
scious of their tasks on the terrain of superstructures, it means that there is 
a necessary and vital connection between structure and superstructures, 
just as there is between the skin and the skeleton in the human body.27
For Gramsci, the conceptual frameworks of common sense are dynamic structures 
that are organically connected to the self-changing social realities of a modernity 
that is fragmented and historically constructed. Social hegemony is a “long war” 
for social, economic, and political dominance between competing social groups 
that fi nd in the conceptual norms of common sense one of their principle battle-
grounds, a battle in which theorist and practitioner alike are a participant. It is a 
“war of position” to frame and defi ne the conceptual norms that inform political 
life and public policy. From this perspective, the ambiguity of the conceptual norms 
employed by modern society to understand itself and formulate sociopolitical action 
and policy is a necessary element of modern society as it is presently constituted.28 
It isn’t a bug in the system; it is a feature.
Second, Gramsci demonstrates that the contested conceptual norms emerging 
from a fractured totality will express the class interests, cultural values, and politi-
cal ideologies of those groups atop the social hierarchy as being universal norms. 
“As long as society is divided into groups, one cannot talk of the ‘spirit’ without 
necessarily concluding that one is dealing with the ‘spirit’ of a particular group.”29 
Gramsci clearly understood that there is no fi xed relation between the interests of 
dominant groups and dominant ideologies, but the conceptual norms and ideolo-
gies held by those groups are overrepresented in the production of cultural, politi-
cal, and intellectual knowledge. Th us those interests and ideologies will necessarily 
be refl ected in the knowledge created. As Marx notes:
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Th e ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, ie. the class 
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force... For each new class which puts itself in the place of the 
one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, 
to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, 
that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universal-
ity, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones.30 
Th e conceptual norms that must emerge from the transformative “real” of Western 
modernity will necessarily refl ect the ensemble of hierarchically structured socio-
political, economic, and cultural relations from which they emerge, and it is here 
that we encounter one of the central problematics of modern philosophy.
Th e transformative real of Western modernity requires that the conceptual 
norms necessary for the smooth functioning of society emerge from a sustained 
inquiry into the dynamic processes that make up that society. Yet, the hierarchal 
structuring of society along the historically constructed fractures of class, race, 
and gender erect practical epistemic barriers to this process of conceptualization. 
Refl ecting the narrowly framed interests, ideologies, and values of groups atop the 
social hierarchy, the conceptual norms emerging from this fragmented totality 
provide inadequate conceptual frameworks for reasoned social activity and ethi-
cal human practice, because they conceal the larger totality of relations involved 
in their domain. Tracing this line of thought from Hegel through Marx and on 
to Gramsci, Stuart Hall explains the epistemological hurdles created by using one 
moment of a dynamic process to understand that process in its totality.
If, in our explanation, we privilege one moment only, and do not take ac-
count of the diff erentiated whole or “ensemble” of which it is a part; or 
if we use categories of thought, appropriate to one such moment alone, 
to explain the whole process; then we are in danger of giving what Marx 
would have called (aft er Hegel) a “one-sided” account. One-sided expla-
nations are always a distortion. Not in the sense that they are a lie about 
the system, but in the sense that a “half-truth” cannot be the whole truth 
about anything. With those ideas, you will always represent a part of the 
whole. You will thereby produce an explanation which is only partially 
adequate—and in that sense, “false.”31 
Th e normativity emerging from modernity’s introspective gaze suff ers from a 
one-sidedness of perspective that limits modernity’s collective ability to accurately 
conceptualize (or refl ect back unto itself) the dynamics that is its subject in the 
concrete (self-knowledge). Th us, social policy or activity formulated within the 
logic of those conceptual frameworks prove unlikely to succeed in fulfi lling stated 
goals and oft en actively work to undermine them (undermining self-determinative 
action). Th e movement from the particular to the universal is the path to abstrac-
tion, the way of despair. 
Dynamic and internally contradictory, the ontology of Western modernity 
creates conceptual norms that are at once dynamic and stable, particular and uni-
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versal. Th ey are norms that are contested, indeterminate, and necessarily suff ering 
from an ambiguity of meaning that refl ects the dynamics of the ideological land-
scape from which they emerge. Remarking on Hegel’s infl uence on Marxian theory, 
Gramsci introduces the intellectual into this nexus of contradiction, normativity, 
and political praxis.
It [Hegelian philosophy] is the full consciousness of contradictions, the 
consciousness wherein the philosopher himself, understood both as an 
individual and as a social group, not only understands contradictions but 
posits himself as an element of the contradiction and raises this element 
to a principle of politics and action.32
Th e ambiguity of the concepts employed in popular discourse requires that we main-
tain an uneasy relationship with these conceptual norms, and it requires a refl exive 
approach in the formulation of public policy and social action within their concep-
tual frameworks. Fulfi lling the organic role Gramsci envisioned for social theorists 
requires a dynamic epistemology that can be used to inform a refl exive methodology 
for working within and through conceptual failure and contradiction. 
A Correspondence Theory of Knowledge 
Kimberly Hutchings identifi es the outlines for just such a dynamic epistemic model 
in Hegelian philosophy. Th e dialectical method detailed in his Phenomenology of 
Spirit is an epistemic model that Hegel developed to reconcile conceptual knowledge 
to the empirical realities that are its subject and to establish the conditions for a self-
knowledge (normativity) that is appropriate to “modernity.” Hegel considered the 
Phenomenology to be the “ladder” to his Science of Logic in that it both established 
the problematics of a self-changing real and a refl exive epistemological framework 
for living in transformation. From Hegel’s perspective, the one-sidedness of the 
conceptual norms emerging from a fractured modernity cannot be transcended in 
pursuit of Truth. Th e way out of despair is to work your way through it. 
A Critical Phenomenology
One of Hegel’s key contributions to philosophic discourse was his early troubling 
of the subject-object dualism of classical Western philosophy. In the dynamics of a 
transformative ontology, Hegel recognized that neither the subject/knower or object 
of knowledge were fi xed essences. Conceiving of the subject and object of knowledge 
in mutually exclusive terms requires of a knowledge claim the privileging of one of 
these to the exclusion of the other as well as “explaining how the identity of these 
non-identical terms has been established.”33 Rejecting the mechanistic relation of 
object-independent minds to mind-independent objects as being mediated by cog-
nition or reason, Hegel conceived of the subject/knower and object of knowledge 
as inextricably linked by the social dynamics in which the knowing subject attains 
consciousness of both herself as a knowing subject and the object of knowledge as 
a subject of inquiry. 
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In particular, Hegel undermines the idea of the subject-knower as an ab-
stract, individuated entity distinct from the object it is trying to grasp. . . 
. [F]or Hegel unpacking the role of self-consciousness in conscious know-
ing involves unpacking the relation of “I” to its natural condition, to other 
“I”s, to its social and historical context and to its historically shift ing forms 
of self-understanding in common sense, religion, art and philosophy. . . . 
[It is] an ontological claim about the co-anchoring of subject and object 
in a shared, material, self-changing reality, which is the medium through 
which claims to knowledge and self-conscious action are possible. Th is 
reality is reducible neither to mind-independent objects nor to object-
independent mind.34
Th e co-anchoring of subject and object in a transformative ontological “real” re-
quires of an inquiring consciousness (individual or group) that an epistemic claim 
fi nd its validation in the recognition of its truth by others, a recognition that de-
pends “on the idea of the possibilities and constraints immanent in what it is to 
be where one is.”35 Th e dynamic relationship between the subject/knower and an 
object of knowledge off ers no privileged position (or position from nowhere) from 
which to justify an epistemic claim. Both the subject and object of knowledge are 
“immanently implicated in the same context which conditions the object of in-
quiry, its philosophical treatment and any meaning which will be generated in the 
encounter.”36 
As Hutchings notes, the principle lesson of the Phenomenology is that con-
ceiving of the subject and object of inquiry as being mutually exclusive and bi-
nary “results in one-sidedness and a consequent failure to comprehend not only 
the excluded or denigrated term, but the ground of the authority of the privileged 
one.”37 A mutual exclusivity of subject and object places an inquirer in the position 
of requiring access to “nomenal and transcendental realms from which human 
understanding was forever excluded.”38 In order to work through this philosophic 
failure or problematic, the Phenomenology presents three “characters”: the know-
ing subject, the object of knowledge, and observing reason (Hegel and the reader). 
Its text traces the repeated attempts by the subject/knower to employ a conceptual 
framework in order to grasp the object of knowledge only to be met with repeated 
failure that returns the subject back to the initial question or issue from which the 
inquiry began. However, with each return to this point of departure, the knowing 
subject incorporates the lessons learned in its previous failures in order to develop 
more sophisticated concepts and modes of understanding. “Th e transformative 
dynamic of this learning process is presented by Hegel as an immanent dialectic 
in which a mode of understanding proves to be unsustainable in its own terms and 
has therefore to be re-conceptualized.”39 Working through conceptual failure and 
contradiction, Hegel outlines an epistemological model appropriate to modernity, 
one that is historically contingent and provisional.
Hegel’s dialectics involves a movement from the clarifi cation and defi nition 
of a concept (subjectivity) to the division of the concept into its determinations 
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within the social totality (particularity) to the transformation of the concept 
into a more sophisticated form through the articulation of the determinations 
and complexities involved in its subject (universality). It is an epistemic model 
that is both deductive and inductive. An inquirer begins with a conception that 
is defi ned in its most immediate form, as it is used most commonly. From there 
the concept is pulled apart into the relations, processes, and complex determi-
nations to which the concept makes reference. In so doing, the one-sidedness of 
the concept becomes manifest at points in which it fails to adequately explain the 
phenomena it supposedly describes or points at which an activity contradicts the 
conceptual norm from which the activity fi nds its justifi cation. Yet, in its divi-
sion, the articulation of the determinations and dynamic processes subsumed by 
a concept provides the necessary preconditions for its transformation. Th rough 
conceptual failure and contradiction a concept is transformed into increasingly 
sophisticated conceptual frameworks of the phenomena to which it makes refer-
ence. It is, as Marx was to later observe, a “working up of observation and con-
ception into concepts.”40 
Th e epistemic model that emerges from Hegelian dialectics is a correspon-
dence theory of truth. Kenneth Westphal explains:
According to Hegel, our experience of the object is structured both by 
our conception of the object and through the object itself, which we en-
deavor to comprehend using that conception. Similarly our experience of 
ourselves as cognizant subjects is structured both through our cognitive 
self-conception and our actual cognitive constitution and engagements, 
which we endeavor to comprehend using that conception. Hegel’s analysis 
implies directly that, on the one hand, we have no concept-free empirical 
knowledge or concept-free self-knowledge. On the other hand, neither are 
we trapped within our “conceptual schemes”! Put positively, our experience 
of the object can only correspond with the object itself if our conception of 
the object also corresponds with the object itself.41
Beneath the metaphysical language of the Phenomenology, Hegel outlines a refl ex-
ive epistemic model that establishes the validity of a knowledge claim by its ability 
to off er answers in the concrete and by its recognition from the “others” always al-
ready implicated in both the subject and object of knowledge. In a dynamic ontol-
ogy of self-changing subjects and objects, these claims are necessarily historically 
contingent and partial. “Th e partiality of any knowledge claim is guaranteed by the 
relative identity (the identity and non-identity) not simply of knower and truth, but 
of knower, the object of knowledge and the ‘observing consciousness’ from whom 
the knower claims, but may well not receive, recognition.”42 
Hutchings’s recovery of Hegelian thought makes an important contribution 
to our larger discussion on the conceptual frameworks of the popular discourse 
in that it establishes “the epistemic ladder” to the methodology that I will employ 
in this research. Hutchings points us toward the conclusion that there is no way to 
transcend the ambiguity of meaning associated with the conceptual norms of popu-
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lar discourse and political speech. “Normative judgment [is] necessarily grounded 
in the complexity of practice and context.”43 
In contrast to an analytical model, the clarifi cation of the conceptual frame-
works of popular discourse requires of an inquirer a “this-worldly” engagement 
with these conceptual norms as they are used in the concrete processes of a hier-
archally fractured, self-changing “reality.” “Hegel off ers an escape from the way 
of despair by following through the logic of despair itself, rather than identify-
ing a transcendent path ‘beyond.’”44 Th e epistemic validity of any one conceptual 
framework is established in an emerging process of engagement with the dynamic 
structures, relations and historical precedents to which it refers. It fi nds its “truth” 
in its ability to answer questions, solve problems and guide human activity within 
those dynamics and in its recognition by the others always already implicated in 
an epistemic claim. 
Th e product of this epistemic engagement is a necessarily historically con-
tingent, provisional claim to knowledge and action inextricably linked to its con-
text. It is an epistemic claim that seeks to not only reconceptualize the subject of 
inquiry through an articulation of the complex determinants that is its subject in 
the concrete but to also construct the conditions of possibility for its recognition by 
“others.” It must seek to establish the necessary preconditions for reasoned debate, 
ethical practice, and constructive activity. It must establish the necessary precon-
ditions for an ethical, emergent normativity. It is an epistemic model that is inher-
ently implicated in political, social, and cultural life.45 
Hutchings notes that Hegel considered the Phenomenology to be “the ladder” 
to his Science of Logic. In turn, I hope to use Hutchings recovery as my ladder, but in 
a rather unique way. Th e dialectical movements of the Phenomenology became the 
synthetic method of the Science of Logic, a methodology that was to have a profound 
impact on two important thinkers in the history of Western modernity: John Dewey 
and Karl Marx. I will construct a synthetic method of philosophic inquiry from a 
recovery of this philosophical infl uence in Dewey’s and Marx’s work so as to benefi t 
from the accumulative contribution made by each of these signifi cant theorists. 
Toward a Synthetic Mode of Inquiry 
Th e synthetic method Hegel developed in the Science of Logic mirrored the three 
moments of his dialectical method in the Phenomenology. What was in the Phe-
nomenology a movement from subjectivity to particularity to universality became 
in the Science of Logic a movement from defi nition (universality) to division (par-
ticularity) to synthesis (individuality). Mirroring the dialectical movements in the 
Phenomenology, the movement from defi nition to division to synthesis constitutes 
a movement of expanding cognition from the abstract universality with which an 
inquirer begins to the complex determinants and contradictions conditioning its 
actualization to its reconceptualization to a level of complexity that is appropriate 
to its subject.  Constructed as a method for establishing the epistemic validity of 
conceptual norms employed by modern society to understand its own complexi-
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ties (self-knowledge) and to formulate reasoned, ethical policy (self-determination), 
Hegel’s Logic was to have a profound impact on Dewey and Marx. Building off  of 
Jim Garrison’s recovery of this infl uence on Dewey46 and Mark Meaney’s recovery 
of its infl uence on Marx, I will construct a synthetic method of philosophic inquiry 
so as to benefi t from each of the voices making a contribution to this conversation.47 
I will fi rst outline the framework for this method through its three movements of 
defi nition, division, and synthesis, and I will fi nish with a discussion of the specifi c 
insights that I take away from each of the conversations presented in this essay.
Defi nition 
If there is an a priori at work in the synthetic method that emerges from this broad, 
far-reaching conversation on the infl uence of Hegel’s Logic, it is an a priori of con-
cepts; more specifi cally, an a priori of an inquirer possessing conceptual norms that 
serve as both common sense knowledge informing practical life as well as an impe-
tus for creative, constructive inquiry. Indeed, inquiry is predicated on the existence 
of an inquirer or inquirers possessing conceptual norms as practical tools for con-
structing their “life-worlds” who fi nd themselves in a problematic situation in which 
a conceptual framework fails in its practical application. As Garrison notes:
[U]niversals [concepts, theories, and the like] are rules for carrying out 
operations; that is, they are norms of action . . . Th e purpose of inquiry is 
to transform an indeterminate situation wherein we have encountered an 
obstacle to smooth functioning into an organically coordinated situation 
that allows us to restore smooth functioning.48 
In Hegelian terms, concepts are not simply common sense norms of self-knowledge; 
they also guide and justify practices, beliefs, activities, and modes of human asso-
ciation. Concepts become manifest in their practical applications in the concrete 
as self-determinative, productive action. Th us, inquiry fi nds its impetus in the 
contradictions and disjunctions that occur in the movement of conceptual norms 
from an abstract universality to the particular determinants that is its subject in 
the concrete. Th ese disjunctions, or “indeterminate situations,” create an impetus 
for inquiry in their disruptions to the smooth functioning of practical everyday 
life,49 and inquiry fi nds its terminus in the re-institution of “factual and conceptual 
subject-matter in conjugate correspondence with each other.”50    
Hegel’s observation that the Begriff  (concept) contains within it moments 
of subjectivity, particularity, and universality is at once an observation on the 
epistemic challenges presented by a transformative ontology51 while also being a 
very pragmatic approach to philosophic inquiry. Th e disjunctions that emerge from 
practical activity and practice may provide the impetus for inquiry, but a synthetic 
method points toward the conceptual norms underpinning those activities and 
practices as the starting point for philosophic inquiry. “[F]or anything to have any 
meaning at all some consolidation of meaning with what is sensibly and physically 
present is always required . . . [A]ll data collection involves some universal, how-
ever restricted.”52
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Th e fi rst task of a synthetic advance is to defi ne the concept or subject of in-
quiry into the moments of Begriff . “Hegel characterizes defi nition as the transfor-
mation of a given objectivity into the simple form of the concept, that is into uni-
versality, particularity, and individuality.”53 In its simple individuality, the concept 
is presented as an abstract representation of the object of knowledge. In its simple 
universality, the concept is defi ned by its normative claims to the simple individual. 
In its simple particularity, the concept is defi ned in the actualization of the simple 
universal in the concrete. “[T]he moments of the concept govern” the initial defi ni-
tion of the concept as well as the “initial consideration of the relationship between 
[its] particularities.”54 Th e fi rst task of a synthetic advance is to defi ne the concept 
in its most immediate form through its own conceptual logic; to defi ne it as what 
Hegel called a logical universal. 
Th is initial movement toward defi nition will provide two essential elements. 
First, it will present the subject of inquiry in its most immediate form within popular 
discourse as a logical universal. Second, and just an important, the moments of the 
concept developed in defi nition will provide the “logic” for determining and isolat-
ing the data required to advance the inquiry process. “Once the logical universal 
has been isolated, the investigator then moves from universality to particularity 
and there isolates the particular determinations or conditions of the universal.”55 
Th e process of defi nition that begins the synthetic method will create a path to be 
retraced in the second movement of a synthetic advance: division.
Division 
Th e second moment of a synthetic analysis is a deductive movement of division. In 
division, the inquiry follows through the logic of the concept defi ned in the previ-
ous moment of defi nition. It requires that an inquirer articulate the concrete con-
ditions and processes that constitute the subject of the logical universal defi ned in 
the fi rst moment of inquiry. “In division, the investigator no longer presents the 
universal in its abstract universality as a defi nition, but in ‘connection’ with its 
own conditions.”56 
In division, the inquirer develops and expands the moments of the concept (or 
logical universal) by retracing the path established in defi nition from particularity 
to universality to individuality. Division begins in the concrete processes in which 
the universal actualizes itself in an articulation of the phenomena it describes, the 
activities it prescribes and the conditions under which those actions are carried out. 
Division requires that an inquirer sift  through the empirical evidence and engage in 
empirical inquiry into the particular determinations of the logical universal in order 
to isolate and develop the processes and conditions of its realization in the concrete 
activities that is its subject. “Th e universal formulates symbolically possible opera-
tions leading to possible consequences that may not occur when the action is carried 
out. Only existential operations provide universals with actual consequences.”57 
Th e moments of the logical universal provide a framework for the movement 
toward division, but it does not dictate the evidence or data that will be used to 
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articulate the particularities generated by the subject of inquiry. “Stimuli, sensa-
tion, data, or facts are never given; rather, they depend on the inquirer’s active 
processes of selection, discrimination, and coordination.”58 A synthetic method 
posits the inquirer as an active participant in the process of inquiry and move-
ment toward knowledge. An inquirer is required to not only identify and justify 
the empirical evidence related to the subject of inquiry but to also expand the in-
vestigation beyond the narrow strictures dictated by the logical universal to related 
phenomena, processes and activities of particular relevance to the larger inquiry. 
“Th e determinations of the data is an active constructive process guided, in part, 
by some universal idea of what is relevant to the larger problematic situation from 
whence the data are selected.”59 
Th rough empirical analysis of the particular determinations of the subject of 
inquiry, the inquirer articulates points of correspondence between the particular 
and the universal as well as points of disjunction in which the universal fails to off er 
an adequate explanation of the phenomena that is its subject or points of contradic-
tion between its prescriptions and its normative justifi cations. Further, empirical 
analysis establishes points in which specifi c practices and processes not initially 
prescribed or articulated by the universal demonstrate a formal relationship to its 
determinants and is of particular relevance to the larger inquiry. Th e articulation of 
the particular determinants that are the subject of the logical universal defi ned in 
the fi rst moment of a synthetic analysis will thus produce an expansive and incho-
ate mass of empirical data and determinants related to the subject of inquiry that 
must be classifi ed according to their relations one to another and to an expanded 
universal in the form of regular syllogisms, or “if-then” propositions. Th is expanded 
universal is then set over and against60 the simple universality articulated in defi ni-
tion and in its relations with an expanded individual representation of the subject 
of inquiry, again in the form of regular syllogisms. 
Th e result of this working back through the moments of the logical univer-
sal is an expanded presentation of the universal as a practical unity of formal re-
lationships that are not necessarily interdependent or organically connected. “In 
division, one merely presents the relationship of universality, particularity and 
individuality as an immediate unity. Division does not consist in a proof that the 
moments are essentially related in an organic unity.”61 Th e deductive movement 
of division presents the universal through its particular determinations and the 
conditions of its actualization in concrete operations. However, in so doing, it cre-
ates the empirical ground for an inductive analysis that synthesizes the particular 
determinants of the universal into a reconceptualized form more appropriate to its 
subject. “Th e way down and the way up are the same since concrete operations may 
suggest symbolization into universal ‘if-then’ formulations of symbolic operations, 
which is why the relation of the two forms of operation [deductive and inductive 
analysis] form a hermeneutic helix.”62
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Synthesis
Dewey described a synthetic mode of analysis as a “double movement.” Using the 
moments of the logical universal identifi ed in defi nition as a framework, synthetic 
inquiry moves deductively toward the particular conditions and complex determi-
nations that are the concrete conditions in which the universal becomes actualized. 
From this grounding, synthetic inquiry then moves by inference and induction to 
a reconceptualized universal. For Dewey, this double movement is a process of go-
ing “to and from meaning.” Garrison explains:
[W]e move from facts [data, kinds, and so on] discriminated and fi xed by 
analysis, through inference, to a suggested meaning [an idea] that syntheti-
cally unifi es the initial facts and additional facts that the idea [hypothesis, 
theory] calls to the inquirer’s attention. . . . Th e relation between inference 
and implication, like that of induction and deduction as well as analysis and 
synthesis to which they closely conjoin, is that . . . [t]hey are subfunctions 
of a single organic function; in Hegel, they are dialectical unity.63 
Th e third and fi nal moment of the synthetic method is this inductive movement 
toward meaning. Benefi ting from the pulling apart of the subject of inquiry into 
its complex processes, conditions, and determinations in division, the fi nal prod-
uct of synthetic inquiry is a transformed universal (concept) developed to a level 
of sophistication that is appropriate to its dynamic subject.
In synthesis, the subject of inquiry (logical universal) is redefi ned as an or-
ganic whole in which its particular determinations are “mediated moments of a 
single process.”64 Th e fi nal movement of synthesis works through the complex de-
terminants developed in division in order to reconceptualize the initial subject of 
inquiry into a more sophisticated framework that escapes the one-sidedness that 
was Hegel’s nemesis while also acting on the world, Dewey’s and Marx’s concern. 
Following Hegel’s Logic, synthesis redefi nes the subject of inquiry as a single pro-
cess mediated by the moments of Begriff  as an organic unity. In its demonstration, 
the inquirer presents the reconceptualized universal through its moments of indi-
viduality, universality, and particularity as if-then propositions that establishes the 
newly constructed framework as a dynamic unity. It is aft er this working through 
the moments of the Begriff  that synthesis reaches its conclusion in a formal defi ni-
tion of the transformed universal.
Th e demonstration of the transformed universal begins by moving through 
the “expanded moments” of division. Th rough a process of inference, implication, 
classifi cation and abstraction, the complexities of the expanded individuality de-
veloped in division are presented as a transformed individuality or representation 
of the object of inquiry. Th e empirical grounding from which the transformed indi-
viduality is constructed provides for a more sophisticated presentation of the subject 
of inquiry and expands the range of possibilities available for the development of 
its other moments. Once presented, the transformed individuality is set over and 
against the expanded universality developed in division in the presentation of a 
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transformed universality as regular syllogisms. Drawing from the expanded uni-
versality, the inquirer makes a series of judgments that adopt, transform, or reject 
the possible normativities made available by the expanded universality in corre-
spondence to its transformed individuality. Continuing, the transformed univer-
sality is then set over and against the expanded particularity established in division 
in the presentation of a transformed particularity as regular syllogisms. Again, the 
inquirer is required to make a series of judgments that adopt, transform, or reject 
the possible practices and determinants made available by the expanded particular-
ity in correspondence to its transformed universality. Th e product of this working 
back through the moments of the concept is a conceptual framework that presents 
the subject of inquiry as mediated moments in dynamic relations; interdependent 
and mutually constituted. Meaney explains:
[B]ecause the relationship between the many determinations is a mediated 
one, the investigator must . . . demonstrate that the object [of knowledge] 
is in fact a concrete unity of distinct moments. Th en, once the process of 
proof is complete, the investigator concludes the inquiry with a second or 
real defi nition that displays the object as a concrete, organic whole.65 
Th rough induction, implication, classifi cation, and inference, the fi nal movement 
of a synthetic analysis is a reconceptualized individual object of knowledge de-
fi ned through the mediated moments always already imminent in a conceptual 
norm or universal. Synthesis fi nds its conclusion in the formal defi nition of the 
subject of inquiry as “symbolic, relational possibilities” that prescribe “existen-
tial operations,” or modes of action, as both the concrete actualization of the re-
defi ned concept into the concrete and the means by which its epistemic validity 
can be established.66 
Synthesis as a Transformative Project
I began this essay with Dewey’s observation about the relative vacuity of public 
debate in order to open a discussion on the ambiguity of meaning associated with 
the conceptual frameworks of “common sense.” Using Dewey’s observation to set 
the stage, I brought Habermas and Gramsci into conversation with Hegel in order 
to demonstrate that this ambiguity of meaning isn’t a bug; it’s a feature. It isn’t a 
question of logic; it’s an ontological perspective.
Th e conversation between Habermas and Gramsci demonstrates that this 
ambiguity of meaning is a product of a dynamic ontology that is simultaneously 
historically constructed and fractured along the lines of class, gender, and race. Th e 
concepts of modern society are at once dynamic and stable. In necessary tension with 
a transformative “real,” these concepts are simultaneously contested by competing 
social actors and agents seeking to frame and reframe their normative claims as 
well as the activities and policies to which these concepts speak. Yet, despite these 
tensions, the concepts are also capable of creating operative realities and achieving 
systemic stability in the realm of “common sense,” the normativity necessary to 
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the smooth functioning of human society. As products of a contested sociopolitical 
landscape, the principle lesson to be learned in this conversation is that modern so-
ciety needs to maintain an uneasy relationship with the conceptual norms of com-
mon sense through which society actualizes itself in self-determinative action. For 
philosophic inquiry, this requires a dynamic approach to epistemology in which 
the validity of a normative claim is to be established in relational correspondence 
to the concrete realities to which it refers, or the conditions of its actualization.
Hutchings teases out just such an epistemic model through her recovery of 
Hegel’s Phenomenology. Th e epistemic model she details is a double movement of 
deductive and inductive cognition in which the inquirer becomes an active partici-
pant in an expanding comprehension of a concept through an articulation of the 
complex determinants that are its subject in the concrete. Th e important lesson we 
take away from Hutchings’s conversation with Hegel is that there is no way to tran-
scend the contradictions and ambiguity of conceptual norms. Philosophic inquiry 
must work through those ambiguities and contradictions in order to reconceptu-
alize norms to the level of sophistication necessary to inform self-determinative 
action without falling prey to performative contradiction. 
Th e product of philosophic inquiry is a necessarily provisional, historically 
contingent conceptual framework. Th e epistemic validity of this conceptual frame-
work is established in the relational correspondence between its normative claims 
and the existential outcomes they generate in their actualization in the concrete. 
Far from the “view from no-where” associated with classical Western philosophy, 
Hutchings’s conversation with Hegel posits philosophic inquiry and inquirer in a 
“this-worldly” engagement that seeks to establish the necessary preconditions for 
the transformation of conceptual norms to the level of sophistication appropriate 
to their existential realities. 
Bringing Garrison and Meaney into conversation with Hegel provides a for-
mal method for accomplishing this philosophic task. Tracing Hegel’s infl uence in 
Dewey and Marx, the synthetic method of philosophic inquiry that emerges from 
this far-reaching conversation mirrors the epistemic model Hutchings recovered 
from Hegel. Moving from an indeterminate situation of conceptual failure and 
contradiction, inquiry begins with a defi nition of a concept in its most immedi-
ate form. From defi nition, inquiry moves through the logic of this conceptual 
framework in a deductive movement that articulates the complex determinants 
and processes conditioning its actualization in the concrete (division). Moving 
inductively from this empirical base, the concept is then synthesized into a con-
ceptual framework through which the indeterminate situation from which inquiry 
began is resolved and through which the epistemic validity of its normative claims 
are to be established. Th e product of a synthetic method is the reconceptualiza-
tion, or redefi nition, of a concept as an organic system of  normativity and ac-
tion; more specifi cally, normative claims that prescribe modes of action through 
which their epistemic validity is to be established and recognized by others. Th e 
synthetic method that has emerged in the preceding pages is a method for car-
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rying out philosophic inquiry that embraces the politics implicit in its domain. 
It is a methodology that empowers a theorist to posit himself or herself as an ele-
ment in the contradictory dynamics of modern society and raise that element to 
a principle of politics and action.67
Conclusion  
In September of 2007, National Public Radio’s Andrea Seabrook interviewed Daniel 
Robinson of Oxford University to off er listeners a philosophic perspective on the “bad 
options” facing American policy in the Iraq War. Th e central problem being, if the 
U.S. pulls out of Iraq, then there will be bloodshed. If the U.S. stays in Iraq, then there 
will be bloodshed. Robinson’s response began with a brief discussion of the classics 
of ethical theory (Aristotle, Kant, and Mill) and ended with a somewhat troubling 
conclusion on the “nerve racking” limits of philosophy. While all three of these moral 
philosophies off er us a course of action, just about every “reasonable” option one could 
think of would likely fi nd support from each of those very same theories. Philosophy 
is not a guide book of answers but a guide book of methods that force us to be more 
deliberative, to distrust our passions, to trust our reason more, and to know our limits. 
While I certainly do not want to devalue or question the necessity of those philosophic 
tasks, demarcating the limits of philosophic inquiry to the role of the gadfl y would go 
a long way toward explaining philosophy’s marginalization in the academy as well as 
philosophy of education’s marginalization in colleges of education.
Perhaps Robinson’s discussion would have benefi ted from a Deweyan per-
spective on the role of philosophy in modern human society. Within a Deweyan 
framework, there is a sociological consciousness implicit in the philosophic recog-
nition of the link between knowledge and action or, in Hegelian terminology, self-
knowledge and self-determination.
All knowledge in short makes a diff erence. It opens new perspectives and 
releases energy in new tasks. Th is happens anyway and continuously, phi-
losophy or no philosophy. But philosophy tries to gather up the threads 
into a central stream of tendency, to inquire what more fundamental and 
general attitudes of response the trend of knowledge exacts of us, to what 
new fi elds of action it calls us. It is in this sense, a practical and moral sense, 
that philosophy can lay claim to the epithets of universal, basic and supe-
rior. Knowledge is partial and incomplete, any and all knowledge, till we 
have placed it in the context of a future which cannot be known, but only 
speculated about and resolved upon. It is, to use in another sense a favorite 
philosophical term, a matter of appearance, for it is not self-enclosed, but 
an indication of something to be done.68
For Dewey, the role of philosophy is to engage the highest ideals and issues of the 
day, “to gather up the threads into a central stream of tendency, to inquire what 
more fundamental and general attitudes of response the trend of knowledge exacts 
of us, to what new fi elds of action it calls us.”69 Dewey’s conditioning of philosophic 
problems through an explication of the dynamic processes that are their subjects in 
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concreto, his “gathering up of the threads,” fi nds its terminus in their resolution, a 
process of conceptualization and human action that “assumes uninterrupted, free, 
and fl uid passage from ordinary experience to abstract thinking, from thought to 
fact, from things to theories and back again.”70 From a Deweyan perspective, philo-
sophic inquiry moves between the ideas animating the social imagination and the 
societal processes and human activities seeking justifi cation in those ideas. It is a 
perspective that seeks to not only trouble our thinking about the diffi  cult issues so-
cieties face but, more importantly, to make judgments as to what is to be done. It is 
a theoretical perspective that positions philosophic inquiry as a political act. 
In this light, Marx’s thesis that “philosophers have only interpreted the world, 
in various ways; the point, however, is to change it” comes into clearer focus.71 
Marx’s critique itself was a Hegelian task that sought to establish the foundation for 
revolutionary change through an interrogation of the highest ideals of an emergent 
capitalist modernity.72 Marx’s praxis philosophy fulfi lled its sociological conscious-
ness through a “ruthless criticism” that sought to “develop new principles for the 
world out of the world’s own principles.”73 Engaging the highest ideals of the day is 
a political act from which the theorist must not withdraw. Th e key is to identify an 
appropriate point, or points, for philosophic intervention. In this regard, I agree with 
Buck-Morss that the nexus for this political act is to be located in “the explanatory 
power of the (Hegelian) full concept” as opposed to Laclau’s conceptualization of 
politics as an “empty signifi er.”74 One of the key political battlegrounds for social 
theory is to be located in the conceptual norms (nomos) preceding, or ordering, so-
cial action and policy formation.75 For the educational theorist, a vital battleground 
for philosophic intervention is to be located in the nomos animating popular debates 
over education reform that precede the formation of education policy. 
As we have seen, the ontological landscape of modernity requires a refl exive 
approach to the conceptual norms emerging from its internal gaze. Nevertheless, 
while necessarily contingent and fallible, conceptual understandings lend them-
selves to certain actions just as social actions lend themselves to certain conceptual 
understandings. Divorcing understanding from action, self-knowledge from self-de-
termination, denies philosophic inquiry that most precious of attributes: relevancy. 
Denied the power of judgment, philosophy is incapable of carrying out such tasks 
as bringing clarity to public discourse and debate, empowering individuals and 
societies to answer tough ethical questions, and providing human society with the 
hermeneutical tools required to ethically organize and inform human action and 
social policy. It becomes disengaged from the world. Th is is an issue of particular 
importance to an applied fi eld such as philosophy of education. If educational theory 
is to be “in” the world it must remain “of” the world. 
While philosophy’s role as the gadfl y is certainly vital, it is just as important 
that philosophic analysis provide mechanisms for working through the issues so-
cieties and individuals face. To return to the example with which this essay began, 
the concepts one would encounter on the Education aisle of a book retailer, such as 
equity and globalization, signify complex issues facing public education in the here 
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and now. Bringing philosophic clarity to these concepts must entail the construc-
tion of new understandings, or conceptualizations, that lend themselves to specifi c 
modes of action (i.e., education policies) while also articulating the means by which 
the epistemic validity of those claims are to be established. A philosophical analysis 
of the concept of globalization must generate new understandings of the relation 
of globalization to public education that point toward specifi c education policies 
and practices while also articulating an agenda for educational research to validate 
those understandings and advance human knowledge. 
In this essay, I have traced the outline of a methodology that provides phi-
losophy with an important tool for fulfi lling its essential role in modern society. 
While necessary, the method developed here places large demands on theorists. It 
is a methodology that requires theorists to work across a wide array of disciplinary 
fi elds and a willingness to engage in empirical research to address gaps in knowl-
edge that emerge from inquiry. However, the critical method outlined in this essay 
provides an important tool in the education theory carpenter box for fulfi lling the 
sociological consciousness implicit in its domain. 
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